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Abstract
In this paper a model based analysis of competition in the German electricity mar-
ket is presented. Applying a multi-regional two-stage model, which captures inter-
regional transmission constraints and the impact of forward trading on spot market
decisions, potential for exercising market power of the four dominant electricity
producers has been found. Assuming Cournot behavior in the spot market, it has
been shown to what extent network reinforcement between Germany and some of
its neighboring countries and increased forward quantities lead to enhanced compe-
tition and decreasing market power potential within the German electricity market.
Key words: Competition analysis, Market power, Two-stage Cournot model,
Forward markets, Interregional electricity exchange.
1 Introduction
As a consequence of the high market concentration due to mergers and acquisi-
tions among generators, the German electricity market faces growing potential
for market power. Over the last few years the four generating companies RWE
Power AG, E.ON Energie AG, Vattenfall Europe AG and EnBW AG formed
an oligopoly with RWE and E.ON having a dominant market position. Taking
the acquisitions within Eastern Europe and Great Britain into consideration,
there are no indicators that a change in the two firms’ dominance could be
expected.
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Considering concentration measures like the CRn concentration ratio or the
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI), Germany’s electricity market can be re-
garded as highly concentrated. Given installed generation capacity, the CR3
approximately amounts to 69%, whereas the CR5 reaches about 80%. The HHI
value yields approximately 1945. Even if traditional concentration measures
can be inappropriate instruments to analyze competition (cf. e. g. Borenstein
et al. (1999) and Borenstein and Shepard (2002)), at least they can indicate
if market power problems probably might occur. Additionally, using ex post
comparison of electricity prices and predicted competitive marginal costs, the
actual degree of market power can be quantified, but it has limited ability to
derive conclusions due to regarded changes in market structure and strategic
behavior. Cf. for an analysis of the Californian electricity market Borenstein
et al. (2000) and Muesgens (2004) for a similar approach regarding Germany.
Given the specific conditions in electricity markets, e.g. low elasticity of de-
mand, non-storability, capacity constraints in generation and transmission and
several alternatives for market behavior, model based analyses which take non-
competitive market transaction into account explicitly, can therefore be more
suitable to diagnose market power (cf. e. g. Smeers (1997) and Borenstein
and Bushnell (1999)). Furthermore, structural and institutional aspects that
influence companies’ potential to exercise market power like increased inter-
connector capacities and the possibility to trade on forward markets should
be addressed within the used model framework.
However, several electricity market models of strategic interaction, which take
interregional transmission constraints into account have already been devel-
oped, cf. e. g. Amundsen et al. (1998), Day et al. (2002) and Metzler et al.
(2003). Moreover, Chuang et al. (2001) and Murphy and Smeers (2002) in-
troduce investment in dynamic models of strategic behavior. For a recent
overview, cf. Neuhoff et al. (2005) and the references therein. Most of the ex-
isting game theoretic models for analyzing market power, applying either a
Cournot or a supply-functions approach. As Cournot models are usually easier
to solve, even if technical constraints regarding generation and transmission
are considered, this type of game has often been modeled. Furthermore, as the
Cournot-Nash solution is representing an upper bound for possible supply-
function equilibria, the calculated market outcome can be interpreted as a
maximum impact of non-cooperative strategic behavior.
In addition to the consideration of network constraints within the various
models, the impact of forward trading on generators’ optimal decisions have
been analyzed e. g. in Green (1999), Newbery (1998), Powell (1993) and Fleten
and Lie (2000). The theoretical framework for this type of models have mainly
been developed by Allaz (1987), Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993), who
described a sequential two-stage game, where oligopolistic producers decide
bout optimal forward quantity before physical production occurs. Assuming a
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non-competitive spot market, forward trading is thus predicted to enhance
competition, due to a decrease in producers’ potential to exercise market
power.
Regarding Germany’s electricity market structure, potential for exercising
market power of the four dominant producers are supposed. Taking interre-
gional electricity exchange and forward trading into account, a multi-regional
two-stage Cournot model has therefore been developed to analyze competition
in the German electricity market. Following the Allaz (1987) and Allaz and
Vila (1993) approach, the impact of increasing forward quantities on spot mar-
ket results has been calculated. Additionally to the analyzed forward market
impact, the model has also been applied to changes in interregional transmis-
sion capacities.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 a short overview regarding
two aspects of the German market structure is given. The mathematical for-
mulation of the developed model is described in Section 3. In section 4 exem-
plary results regarding changes in cross-border capacities and forward contract
quantities are presented. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2 The German electricity market
Germany is highly integrated within the European electricity market, having
various interconnections with its neighboring countries. Until the market was
liberalized in 1998, it was characterized by vertically integrated utilities, sup-
plying residential and industrial consumers. With the opening of Germany’s
electricity market, several changes regarding structural and operational as-
pects can be observed.
2.1 Interregional electricity exchange
Regarding the central location of Germany, interregional electricity exchange
has been continuously increased over the last years. Sharing borders with
France, Luxembourg, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Poland,
Czech Republic, Austria and Switzerland, Germany’s gross electricity ex-
change has grown from approximately 72 TWh in 1995 to approximately
100 TWh in 2003 and 96 TWh in 2004, respectively (cf. UCTE (2005)).
As interregional transmission in Europe was mainly coordinated to balance
variations in demand and supply on the inter-country level, it has recently
become more important regarding trading aspects. Due to legally unrestricted
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international electricity trade possibilities, cross-border exchange is projected
to serve common economic purposes, particularly to reduce interregional price
differences. However, beside the legal framework, technical aspects concerning
transmission and production have to be taken into account, when market
structure and regionally varying electricity prices in Europe are to be analyzed.
2.2 Spot and derivatives market
The European Energy Exchange AG (EEX) in Leipzig is operating a day-
ahead spot market for physical contracts since 2000. Within a double-sided
call auction, market participants submit bits for the quantity they want to
purchase and to sell the following day. Single hour contracts of 0.1 MW delivery
capacity and block contracts for multiple hours of 1 MW delivery capacity
can be traded each day until noon. After collecting all bits in a closed order
book, EEX aggregates individual supply and demand curves to determine a
uniform market clearing price. Physical delivery can be executed in each of
the five transmission system operator (TSO) zones. In absence of transmission
congestion, the spot market price is the same for all of Germany. Given the
possible trading options at the established spot market, the market clearing
price can therefore be regarded as a reference for other market segments.
Considering the amount of electricity traded at the EEX, it can be observed
that spot market quantity has continuously increased since 2000. While quan-
tity amounts to approximately 14 TWh in 2001, the traded quantity is about
25 TWh in 2002 and 48 TWh in 2003. In the year 2004 a total of approxi-
mately 59 TWh was contracted through the physical spot market in Germany.
Regarding total electricity consumption, the traded spot market volume was
about 11% in 2004.
Beside the day-ahead market, the EEX also established a derivatives market
in 2001. As spot market contracts call for physical delivery of electricity the
next day, derivative contracts usually are fulfilled financially. After financial
settlement, the contracted quantity can be obtained at the spot market. More
general, derivatives enclose both futures contracts with financial settlement
only and forward contracts which call for delivery or purchase of the com-
mitted electricity quantity. At the EEX base load and peak load futures and
forwards can be traded, respectively. Among other things, the contracts are
standardized concerning the delivery period, i. e. monthly, quarterly and yearly
respectively, the load profile, the place of delivery, the contract volume, which
is 1 MW for each hour committed and the tradeable period for this contract.
Considering given market risks like uncertain demand and price, derivatives
can be used for risk hedging and speculative reasons. As e. g. Allaz (1987) has
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already shown, forward contracts can also be used strategically by oligopolistic
producers in non-competitive markets to enhance spot market position. In
2003 a quantity of approximately 342 TWh has been traded at the EEX
derivatives market, whereas approximately 338 TWh were committed in 2004,
showing a ratio of about 88% base load contracts.
3 The model
For analyzing competition in the German electricity market, a multi-regional,
two-stage Cournot model has been developed. The German electricity market
is considered to be a 4 player oligopoly facing a competitive fringe and being
physically interconnected to its European neighboring countries. Figure 1 de-
picts regions and transmission lines covered by the model. Electricity markets
within the German neighboring regions are assumed to be fully competitive.
Transmission capacities are supplied by a Single Transmission System Oper-
ator (TSO) and are based on average Net Transfer Capacities (NTC) for the
years 2002 to 2004 provided by the European Electricity System Operators
(ETSO) (cf. Table 1). Power plant portfolios for RWE Power AG, E.ON En-
ergie AG, Vattenfall Europe AG, EnBW AG and the competitive fringe are
modeled on a unit basis, whereas portfolios for the neighboring countries are
represented on a higher aggregation level. Electricity demand is separated in
peak and off-peak load distinguishing summer, winter and intermediate peri-
ods. The electricity suppliers solve a two-stage optimization problem. In the
first stage, generators sell forward contracts in the German market that call
for delivery in the second stage. In the second stage, producers maximize their
profits in the spot market, taking the forward market decisions, generation and
transmission constraints into account. For the analysis presented in this paper,
a deterministic version of the Cournot model is applied, solving an one-shot
game with exogenous variations of forward contract cover and interregional
transmission investments.
3.1 Demand side
Time varying electricity demand in the several countries is represented by ap-
proximated load duration curves. To capture different load situations in a year,
the load duration curves are decomposed into two load (peak, off-peak) and
three time segments (summer, winter, intermediate). For Germany, load varies
from 40275 MW in the summer off-peak load segment to 68331 MW in the
winter peak load segment. Peak load contains demand values for weekdays
from 08:00 a.m. to 08:00 p.m. whereas the off-peak load segment contains
the hours on weekends and the hours from 08:00 p.m. to 08:00 a.m. on week-
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days. Hence, peak load covers 960 hours and off-peak load 1960 hours each
time segment, respectively. Demand values are based on data for the year
2000 provided by the Union for Co-ordination of Transmission for Electricity
(UCTE). Figure 2 exemplary presents the decomposition of the load duration
curve for Germany.
Demand curves for each region, load and time segment in the spot market are
modeled applying an inverse constant elasticity demand function. Equilibrium
electricity price Pt,s,r(St,s,r) : R
+ 7→ R+ is a function of the form:
Pt,s,r(St,s,r) = P
ref
t,s,r
(
Pt,s,r(St,s,r)
Sreft,s,r
) 1
ǫ
(1)
with St,s,r being total supply in each time segment t, each load segment s
and each country r. The demand curves are calibrated by using reference
prices for each demand segment and each country. Reference prices for e. g.
Germany were calculated from European Energy Exchange AG (EEX) data
for the year 2002. According to the demand segment specification, averaged
system marginal prices lie at 13.31 e/MWh for the summer off-peak and
34.98 e/MWh for the intermediate peak load segment, respectively. Price
elasticity of demand ǫ is assumed to be −0.25 within the different load seg-
ments. Figure 3 depicts exemplary inverse demand curves for different load
situations in Germany.
3.2 Supply side
On the supply side, real technical and economical data for specification of the
different types of fossil fired power plants and non-fossil power plants are taken.
The overall production capacities are assumed to be given. Specific operation
cost for each type of unit are calculated on the basis of fuel prices, additional
operation and maintenance cost and electrical efficiencies. Power plant effi-
ciencies are based on fuel type and the date of unit commissioning. However,
the technologically oriented representation of production capacities facilitates
a relatively realistic approximation of the generation structure within the sev-
eral countries.
The differentiated electricity generation portfolios of the four German supply-
ing companies on the one hand and the more aggregated generation portfolios
for the nine neighboring countries on the other hand, included in the model,
represent almost 95 % of the installed generation capacity in each country.
Ordering the different production units regarding their variable production
costs, a country-specific merit order curve can be constructed. Figure 4 de-
picts the merit order curve for Germany based on the installed capacities for
2005.
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For analyzing the potential to exercise market power in the German electricity
market, the given market structure has to be taken into account. Therefore,
the overall installed generation capacity has to be allocated among strategic
players. According to the analysis of the given horizontal capital ownerships
among utilities, the strategically controlled production capacities can be de-
rived. Due to focusing on the German market and assuming that electricity
markets in the neighboring countries are fully competitive, only the major
German generation companies are represented in detail. Furthermore, capital
ownership across borders has been neglected, thus German suppliers utilize do-
mestic capacities only. Table 2 gives an overview to the individual generation
capacities owned by the four strategic players in Germany and the aggregated
capacities of the neighboring countries.
To derive individual merit oder curves or marginal cost curves, for each strate-
gic player and fringe supply, respectively, installed generation capacity has
been adjusted to given technical and seasonal availability. Average planned
unit outage for conventional power plants and time varying water inflow for run
of river and lake power plants, respectively, has been taken into account to dis-
tinguish time depending availability. Furthermore, pumped storage capacities
are assumed to be available in the peak load segment only. This assumption
has been made due to the static structure of the model. As power plants are
not dispatched dynamically, pumped storage capacities are assumed to pump
in off-peak periods. Moreover, pump losses φt,s−,r, with s
− ∈ {off − peak} are
derived from historical data. Hence, merit order curves for peak and off-peak
load differ considerably for particular players and countries, respectively. As
a result, each company is represented by six different marginal cost curves.
Similarly, six varying marginal cost curves for each of the German neighbor-
ing countries has been constructed. Figures 5 and 6 present the marginal cost
curves for E.ON Energie AG and Vattenfall Europe AG, respectively, which
are based on average available generation capacities.
As the model is formulated in Mixed Complementarity Problem (MCP) for-
mat, here the stepwise marginal cost functions are approximated by strictly
increasing polynomials. Marginal cost functions Ci,t,s(xi,t,s) : R 7→ R
+ are of
the form:
Ci,t,s(xi,t,s) = c1x
4
i,t,s + c2x
3
i,t,s + c3x
2
i,t,s + c4xi,t,s + c5 (2)
where c1 to c4 ∈] −∞,∞[ and c5 ∈ [0,∞[ are estimated by a least squares
method algorithm. Generation by firm i ∈ I in time segment t and load
segment s, xi,t,s ∈ [0, x
max
i,t,s ] is constrained by firm’s available capacity x
max
i,t,s .
Following the assumption, that cross-border ownership is neglected, the firms’
electricity production takes place in the country they are located.
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3.3 Two-stage market structure
The model described has two stages. In the first stage, the forward market,
German electricity suppliers decide about the amount of forward contracts
they want to sell. These forward contracts call for delivery in the second
stage. The second stage is the physical spot market, where generation takes
place. However, a forward market is assumed to be operated in Germany only.
This restriction is due to focusing on strategic interactions within the German
electricity market and the assumption that market structures in neighboring
countries are fully competitive.
German producers trade in the forward market before optimizing their gener-
ation program in the spot market. Spot market behavior of the four strategic
players is assumed to be of Cournot type profit maximization. Fringe suppliers
and generators in neighboring countries behave as price takers. Deciding about
first stage contracting and second stage supply, taking fringe supply, interre-
gional electricity trade as well as production and transmission constraints into
account, producers face a constrained two-stage optimization problem, which
can be solved backwards.
Solving the second stage optimization problem first, each oligopolistic supplier
i ∈ I maximizes its profit Πi,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, fi,t,s) : R
n 7→ R by determining the op-
timal electricity output si,t,s,r. With suppressing indices for demand segments
t (time), s (load) and r (country), profit for each player can be written as:
max
si
Πi(si, fi) = P (S)si + fi(P
f − P (S))− TCi(si) ∀ i, t, s, r (3)
with S =
∑
i∈I si being aggregated supply by all generators. TCi(si) : R 7→ R
+
represents total generation cost for supply of player i in the spot market,
whereas P f is the forward price and fi(P
f − P (S)) being the profit from
selling forward contracts. When producers decide about their optimal output
quantity in the second stage, P f is a constant, hence the term fiP
f can be
ignored in the profit maximization.
On the second stage, firms’ generation is constrained by its maximum available
production capacity. The production constraint gi(xi) : R 7→ R has to be
satisfied for each firm i in each demand segment
gi(xi) : xi − x
max
i ≤ 0 ∀ i, t, s (4)
As interregional electricity trade is allowed, producers decide not only about
the quantity they want to sell in their country r, but also about the amount
they want to sell in foreign countries rr, i. e. export. Exports are denoted by
srri,t,s,r, with the superscript indicating the country of destination. The TSO
supply transmission services at marginal cost of congestion. Therefore, the
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producers in country r have to take interregional transmission capacity con-
straints and possible congestion charge into account. The transmission con-
straint er,rr(S
rr
r , S
r
rr) : R
n 7→ R for each line r → rr of distinct countries, that
has to be satisfied, is:
er,rr(S
rr
r , S
r
rr) :

∑
i−
srri,r +
∑
i+
sri,rr

− tmaxr→rr ≤ 0 ∀ t, s (5)
with i− denoting suppliers located in country r and i+ denoting suppliers
located in country rr. Again, following the assumption that electricity markets
in the neighboring countries are fully competitive, imports to Germany are
priced at marginal production costs. Each interregional transmission line has
a maximum capacity of tmaxr→rr, whereas inner-country transmission is assumed
to be unconstrained. In addition, transport losses between district countries
has being neglected. Total electricity supply per demand segment in a country
r can therefore be written as:
Sr =
∑
i−∈I
sri,r +
∑
i+∈I
sri,rr ∀ t, s, r (6)
For Germany (rDE), domestic electricity supply can also be described in more
detail by distinguishing oligopoly supply on the one side and competitive fringe
supply on the other side:
SrDE =
∑
i
sr
DE
i,rDE + s
rDE
fringe,rDE ∀ t, s (7)
Considering production/supply and demand balance in each demand segment
and each country, production has to be adjusted regarding network and pump
losses. Contrary to the neglected additional transmission losses due to interre-
gional trade, network losses within a country θt,s,r have been captured in the
model. With pump losses φt,s−,r, production has to be:
xi ≥
∑
r
si, r(1 + θr + φr) ∀ i, t, s (8)
which equals overall electricity demand in each segment and each country.
Estimated network losses are derived from historical data, similarly to the
estimation of pump losses for the off-peak periods.
However, when producers maximize their profit on the spot market by opti-
mizing their output, they have to take the constraints gi(xi) and er,rr(S
rr
r , S
r
rr)
into account. The resulting nonlinear program with inequality constraints can
be formulated in mixed complementarity format. For maximizing the second
stage profit function (cf. Eq. (3)) for every player simultaneously, the first or-
der Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions have been derived. In equilibrium, none
of the players and generators, respectively, is willing to change its production
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program. Due to the form of the approximated marginal cost and demand
functions, the resulting Cournot-Nash equilibrium represents an unique solu-
tion to the given problem.
Introducing a function Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr) : R
n 7→ Rn similar to a La-
grangian, the first order conditions of the nonlinear program that have to be
satisfied are:
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂si,t,s,r
=
∂Pt,s,r(St,s,r)
∂St,s,r
∂St,s,r
∂si,t,s,r
si,t,s,r + Pt,s,r(St,s,r)
−
∂Pt,s,r(St,s,r)
∂St,s,r
∂St,s,r
∂si,t,s,r
fi,t,s,r−
−Pt,s,r(St,s,r)
∂fi,t,s,r−
∂si,t,s,r
−
∂TC(si,t,s,r)
∂si,t,s,r
−λi,t,s −
∑
r→rr
τr→rr ≤ 0 ∀ i, t, s, r (9)
complements
si,t,s,r ≥ 0 ∀ i, t, s, r (10)
and the inner product
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂si,t,s,r
si,t,s,r = 0 ∀ i, t, s, r (11)
Partial derivative, taking into account the given production constraint for a
generator is:
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂λi,t,s
= si,t,s,r − s
max
i,t,s,r ≤ 0 ∀ i, t, s (12)
complements
λi,t,s ≥ 0 ∀ i, t, s (13)
and the inner product
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂λi,t,s
λi,t,s = 0 ∀ i, t, s (14)
It should be noted that, concerning definition in Eq. (4), the generation ca-
pacity constraint gi(xi) is related to xi,t,s. As xi,t,s and si,t,s,r are linked by the
production/supply balance (cf. Eqs. (8)), the supply variable si,t,s,r is applied
in Eq. (12) and (14), due to consistency in mathematical notation.
Partial derivatives, taking into account the given transmission constraint fi-
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nally, results in:
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂τr→rr
=

∑
i−
srri,r +
∑
i+
sri,rr

− tmaxr→rr ≤ 0 ∀ r → rr
(15)
complements
τr→rr ≥ 0 ∀ r → rr (16)
and the inner product
∂Li,t,s,r(si,t,s,r, λi,t,s, τr→rr)
∂τr→rr
τr→rr = 0 ∀ r → rr (17)
Considering the constraints of given production and transmission capacities,
Eq. (12) and Eq. (15) are associated with the variables λi,t,s and τr→rr, respec-
tively. λi,t,s denotes the shadow variable or shadow price of the production
constraint, whereas τr→rr denotes the the shadow variable or shadow price of
congestion of a transmission line between distinct countries. Due to the as-
sumption that the TSO supplies transmission services at marginal congestion
cost, τr→rr can be interpreted as a congestion fee, generators have to take
into account when maximizing spot market profit. Therefore, interregional
trade decisions are determined by interregional price differences and marginal
transmission cost.
Following the Cournot assumption that competitors are supposed to not re-
act to player i’s output decision, i. e. the conjectural variation is zero, the
term ∂S/∂si in Eq. (9) can be ignored. This assumption also holds for the
competitive fringe and the foreign generators concerning oligopolistic supply.
Regarding the dynamic effects, optimal second stage output depends on first
stage contacting, as discussed above. Hence, fi in Eq. (9) leads to si(fi) : R 7→
R, indicating the influence of forward market decisions on spot market supply.
Producers can thus use forward contracts strategically to influence their spot
market position. A larger forward market position, that calls for delivery in
the spot market (fi > 0) induces an increased output quantity of firm i and
therefore an increase in i’s market share. This is more obvious by calculating
the second stage marginal revenue with forward contracts MRi(si, fi) : R 7→
R. Forward contracts shift marginal revenue upwards. As price elasticity is
negative (ǫ < 0), an additional unit of electricity sold forward will have a
positive effect on marginal revenue. This strategic incentive of forward trading
leads to increased second stage supply by each oligopolistic player and hence
to a decrease in spot market price.
How forward trading can influence second stage behavior and thus the result-
ing spot market equilibrium, can be well shown by rearranging the first order
condition in Eq. (9) (indices suppressed). Applying market share ϑi and price
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elasticity of demand ǫ, player i’s constrained profit maximization condition is:
P (S)
(
1 +
ϑi
ǫ
−
ϑi
ǫ
fi
si
)
= Ci(si) + λi +
∑
r→rr
τr→rr ∀ i, t, s, r (18)
where Ci(si) denotes marginal cost of second stage generation si (cf. Eq. (2))
and λi and τr→rr indicate the shadow variables of the given production and
transmission constraints, respectively.
As first stage contracting shifts second stage marginal revenue upwards, for-
wards can be used as strategic instruments to improve spot market position.
Beside the risk hedging motive, which leads to either a long or a short posi-
tion in the forward market, e. g. induced by uncertain residual demand, due
to stochastic wind power supply, strategic forward trading calls for delivery in
the spot market, assuming Cournot behavior.
The influence of the pre-committed forward quantity on the second stage
generation is indicated by the term fi/si in Eq. (18). Thus, fi/si can be in-
terpreted as the degree of contract cover, firm i has realized in the forward
market, due to risk hedging and strategy. Assuming fi/si = 0, the oligopolist
does not trade forward and is playing the Cournot game in the spot market.
Assuming on the other hand, fi/si = 1, i. e. the oligopolist’s physical output
is fully contracted through the forward market, he ends up as a price taker,
loosing all of his market power. By varying fi/si ∈ [0; 1] exogenously, different
forward market strategies, i. e. degree of contract cover, can be simulated.
Concerning the general approach of modeling the two-stage game of forward
trading and spot market supply, the resulting second stage Cournot-Nash
equilibrium is taken into account by the producers, when optimizing the degree
of contract cover. For optimizing first stage contracting, players consider given
uncertainty and their risk aversion on the one side and the strategic use of
forwards on the other side. However, for the analysis described here, first stage
contracting is simulated by varying the degree of contract cover exogenously
without deriving optimal forward decisions explicitly. Moreover, due to the
assumed approximation of the merit order curves by a polynomial of higher
degree, an analytical solutions for the first stage optimum, to be implemented
in complementarity format, seems to be difficult.
4 Exemplary model results
The model described above has been applied to analyze competition in the
German electricity market. Given the current market structure, German elec-
tricity suppliers form a four player oligopoly with a competitive fringe. To what
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extend the four dominante oligopolistic producers RWE Power AG, E.ON En-
ergie AG, Vattenfall Europe AG and EnBW AG can exercise market power
depends on various factors. Beside the type of market behavior, absolut fringe
supply possibilities and the assumptions made regarding anticipation towards
fringe reaction, the potentials for exercising market power depend highly i)
on the possibilities to limit price increase by electricity imports and ii) the
option to trade specific production quantities on a forward market. In the fol-
lowing subsections, exemplary model results considering this two aspects are
presented.
4.1 Base case
Assuming that the liberalized German electricity market is not integrated in
the European UCTE network and assuming furthermore that there is no possi-
bility for forward trading, a one stage Cournot-Nash equilibrium in quantities
for the physical spot market can be calculated. Given this restrictive assump-
tions, the derived market equilibrium represents the potentials for exercising
market power by the four oligopolistic suppliers as an upper bound for possible
market manipulation. Figure 7 presents resulting market prices in the defined
demand segments. The price elasticity of demand ǫ is assumed to be −0.25.
Considering the potentials to increase market prices by withholding capacity,
i. e. reducing supply, the German electricity market seems not to be perfectly
competitive. Under the given assumptions, dominant producers are able to
increase prices between factors of approximately 2.0 (summer off-peak pe-
riod) and 2.6 (winter peak period), compared to a calculated perfectly com-
petitive equilibrium. Electricity price e. g. in the summer off-peak segment
increases therefore from 15.84 e/MWh in the perfectly competitive case to
31.27 e/MWh under Cournot behavior. In the winter peak segment prices
change from 28.40 e/MWh (competitive) to 74.74 e/MWh (Cournot), cf. Fig-
ure 7. The observable price increases result from significant mark-ups, which
can be realized by the oligopolistic producers. Table 3 presents minimum and
maximum values of the Lerner-Index and overall profit under different as-
sumptions regarding producers’ behavior in the base case.
It can be seen that the competitive fringe profits substantially from strate-
gic behavior of the four dominant producers in Germany. As the competitive
fringe behaves as a price taker, its generation is increased significantly due to
higher electricity prices. Moreover, within the peak load segments, the Lerner-
Index of fringe supply results in values greater than zero, indicating a situation
in which prices exceed marginal cost. This can be explained with limitations
in their generation capacity. Even if electricity prices are above marginal gen-
eration cost, fringe suppliers are not able to extend their production further.
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Regarding overall efficiency of electricity generation, it can be shown that
strategic behavior leads to unbalanced marginal cost among generators and
therefore to a suboptimal allocation of production factors. The observable shift
in generation from RWE, E.ON, Vattenfall and EnBW to fringe producers,
increases dead weight losses additionally. Considering the existing power plant
portfolios, it is evident that relatively high priced gas and oil units are utilized
by the competitive fringe in equilibrium.
4.2 Interregional transmission
Given the actual situation, where Germany is integrated into a large European
electricity network having various interconnection to its neighboring countries,
the restrictive assumption in the base case have to be relaxed. Moreover, with
reinforcing the internal European electricity market, the European Union aims
to strengthen competition among generators and to improve overall efficiency.
Regarding the interregional transmission possibilities, competition analyses
have to take into account the potentials to limit price increases due to exercised
market power by electricity imports.
Allowing for interregional electricity exchange, i. e. extending the options to
optimize spot market decisions for the German players and the generators in
foreign countries, by modeling existing transmission lines (cf. Table 1), leads
to significant changes in results. Regarding the exchange possibilities, foreign
generators can profit from market power induced price increases in Germany
by exporting electricity to the German market. Thereby foreign electricity
exports keep pressure on prices in Germany, preventing for mark-ups observ-
able in the base case scenario. Figure 8 presents a price comparison for the
Cournot-Nash equilibria in the base case (Cournot (BC)), in the case where in-
terregional electricity exchange is allowed (Cournot (i)) and the corresponding
perfectly competitive equilibrium with transmission (Competitive (i)).
As can be seen, interregional electricity exchange forces down prices in the
Cournot (i) scenario by approximately 32% for the summer off-peak period and
40% for the winter peak period, compared to the Cournot (BC) equilibrium
in the base case. Nevertheless with these price decreases, the large German
players are able to raise market prices by factors of between approximately
1.3 (summer off-peak) and 1.6 (winter peak) over the competitive equilibrium.
According to the observable price changes, values for the Lerner-Index and the
overall profit decrease also, cf. Table 4. It can be noted, that in equilibrium
the profits decrease, assuming both Cournot and competitive behavior, except
a slight increase in profit of RWE Power AG in the competitive case. Due
to interregional trade, this effect can be lead back to profitable exports to
neighboring countries and domestic price changes, which can possibly cause
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positive effects on profit. However, a detailed presentation of results regarding
exchange values and regional specific numbers is omitted here.
Considering the current structure of the European transmission grid, e. g.
Haubrich et al. (2001) analyzed the cross-border capacities to identify critical
bottlenecks within the internal European market. As was seen in comparison
of base case results with the scenario where interregional exchange was al-
lowed, congestion in transmission lines can negatively influence regional price
adjustment and therefore be a crucial factor to prevent market power mitiga-
tion. Taking into account transmission reinforcement projects that have been
already identified by the European Commission within the Trans-European
Energy Networks (TEN-E) priority projects, several bottlenecks can be iden-
tified for German cross-border trade.
Following Haubrich et al. (2001), the interconnections among Belgium/Ger-
many and the Netherlands as well as Denmark and Germany can be regarded
as highly congested all over the year. Additionally, the cross-border link be-
tween France and Germany shows occasionally congestion, particularly in sum-
mer. Beside the already mentioned interconnections within the BeNeLux re-
gion, transmission lines between Belgium and France have been identified as
critical bottlenecks, which may have an impact on market outcome in Ger-
many. Thus, applying the model for analyzing the competition enhancing ef-
fects of transmission capacity expansion between Germany and its neighboring
countries, the following reinforcement projects are considered.
• Germany ⇐⇒ the Netherlands, 700 MW
• Germany ⇐⇒ France, 600 MW
• Germany ⇐⇒ Denmark, 1250 MW
• Belgium ⇐⇒ the Netherlands, 1000 MW
• Belgium ⇐⇒ France, 1000 MW
Increasing the congested German cross-border transmission capacities leads
to increased pressure on the dominant firms to lower mark-ups and hence to a
decrease in market price. As possibilities to export electricity into the German
market grow, potentials for exercising market power decline. The competition
enhancing effect of interregional electricity exchange has already been observed
by comparing the base case results with the situation where interregional
transmission is considered. The resulting effects on prices, due to the specified
grid enlargement are presented in Figure 9. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium
with capacity expansion is denoted by Cournot (i+), whereas Competitive (i+)
represents the corresponding perfectly competitive equilibrium. It can be seen
that the strategically influenced electricity price is reduced by approximately
5% in the summer off-peak period, whereas the price reduction in the winter
and intermediate peak periods amounts to 10%, compared to the Cournot-
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Nash equilibrium considering the current transmission capacities (Cournot(i)).
Again, the potentials to increase market price by withholding capacities and
supply respectively, can also be analyzed by calculating the Lerner-Index, cf.
Table 5. As expected, Lerner-Index and profit is reduced, due to enhanced
imported competition by foreign electricity supply in the German market.
Summarizing, the results indicate that reinforcement of the above considered
transmission lines within the internal European electricity market mitigates
the potentials to exercise market power in Germany. Hence, the reduction of
network congestion is therefore suitable to enhance competition and therefore
to lower electricity prices in Germany, given its oligopolistic market structure.
4.3 Forward trading
Beside the positive impact of interregional transmission possibilities on com-
petition, particularly in non-competitive market environments, Allaz (1992)
and Allaz and Vila (1993) have shown that forward trading can have a similar
effect. Since most of the liberalized electricity markets have institutionalized
forward and futures markets, market power analyses should take these trading
options into account. Considering the 2001 established derivatives market at
the European Electricity Exchange in Germany, domestic and foreign Euro-
pean electricity producers and consumers are enabled to use the traded prod-
ucts for various purposes. As RWE Power AG, E.ON Energie AG, Vattenfall
Europe AG and EnBW AG are all trading participants in the spot and the
derivatives market at the EEX, it can be considered that these players use the
trading options to improve their market position.
As mentioned above, forwards and futures can be used for risk hedging and
strategic motives (cf. also e. g. Allaz, 1987). Within the analysis described here,
the distinction between risk hedging and strategic motives can be neglected,
as the main focus lies on the impact of increased forward trading on the
spot market equilibrium in Germany. Thereby only positive forward quantities
fi ≥ 0 that call for delivery in the spot market are considered, i. e. dominant
producers are assumed to be short on the forward market (cf. Subsection 3.3).
For analyzing the competitive effects of increasing forward quantities, the
amount of pre-committed physical production has been varied exogenously.
To cover the range between no contracts and a situation where the producers
are fully contracted on the forward market, the degree of contract cover (fi/si)
has been varied between 0% and 100%. A degree of contract cover of 0% yields
the usual Cournot-Nash equilibrium on the spot market, whereas a degree of
contract cover of 100% leads to the perfect competitive market outcome (cf.
Eq. (18)). The calculation is executed by changing the ratio in 5% steps for
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all oligopolistic players simultaneously. A simulation of asymmetric contract
cover scenarios for individual players has not been considered here (cf. e. g.
Ellersdorfer, 2005).
However, the scenarios analyzed here are based on the case where interregional
electricity exchange is allowed, considering current interconnection capacities.
The presented scenario is denoted by Cournot (ii), whereas the correspond-
ing scenario without forward trading is Cournot (i), described in the previous
subsection. Implementing a forward market in Germany and allowing for for-
ward trading provides oligopolistic players with instruments to influence their
spot market position. When oligopolists use forward contracts for strategic
reasons, which call for delivery, they increase their physical production and,
hence lower spot market prices. It should be noted that the identical results
can be predicted, if producers sell forward contracts for risk hedging reasons.
Figure 10 presents the impact on electricity prices in the different demand
segments when the oligopolistic producers increase their contract quantity si-
multaneously.
It can be observed that the price decrease is nearly linear in the different de-
mand segments, except for the summer and intermediate peak periods, which
show a little break. Reaching a contract ratio of 100%, prices went down to the
competitive level. Hence, oligopolistic producers loose whole of their market
power and behave as price takers, respectively. Figure 11 presents exemplary
values for the Lerner Index in the winter off-peak period. As the degree of
contract cover increases, price mark-up decreases.
As the amount of pre-committed production quantity grows, spot market sup-
ply increases, leading to the shown significant price reductions. Cf. Figure 12
for production in the winter off-peak period and Figure 13 for the intermediate
peak segment. Despite growing spot market supply, producers are worse off
when they all increase their forward quantity simultaneously, due to a com-
pensating price effect. Thus, individual and industry profits are cut down.
Figure 14 presents the four large German producers’ and fringe’s profits.
Considering the induced impact on electricity prices, mark-ups and production
quantities, it can be observed that the implementation of a forward market
can have positive effect on the market outcome in Germany. When the Ger-
man dominant electricity suppliers use forward contracts, which call for the
delivery in the spot market either for strategic or risk hedging motives, en-
hanced competition is predicted. Moreover, forward trading as it is specified
here, can be assumed to decrease dead weight loss and have a positive effect
on social welfare. Beside enhancing the possibilities for interregional electricity
exchange within the internal European market, a strengthening of derivative
trading options is considered to mitigate market power in Germany.
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4.4 Network reinforcement and forward trading
Following the above argumentation that both interregional electricity exchange
and forward trading can lead to enhanced competition in Germany, it is ob-
vious that network investment improves market outcome in a situation where
oligopolistic firms additionally pre-commit spot market production. To ren-
der an exemplary analysis of how network investment effects electricity prices
quantitatively, a scenario in which cross-border capacity between Germany
and the Netherlands is being enlarged by 3000 MW has been calculated
(Cournot (ii+)). Increasing the interconnection capacity in steps of 150 MW
each, it can be seen that, depending on the level of contract cover, capacity
enlargement can have different effects on prices, both in Germany and the
Netherlands.
Figure 15 presents the development of electricity prices in the summer peak
period in Germany. Again, given the current transmission capacities, i. e. net-
work investment is zero, the Cournot (ii) result is determined. Assuming that
bilateral transmission capacity to the Netherlands is going to be enlarged, the
price within the German market decreases when contract cover is low, whereas
price increases slightly when firms are fully contracted. Thereby, electricity
price falls by approximately 2.0e/MWh when playing the usual Cournot-Nash
game, whereas price increases by approximately 1.0 e/MWh in the perfectly
competitive equilibrium. The observable price increase in Germany is induced
by higher electricity exports by German suppliers to the Netherlands. Given
the current price differences between both countries, German producers find
it favorable to shift specific amounts of production from the German to the
Dutch market. Moreover, due to this behavior, electricity prices in Germany
and the Netherlands were equalized from an additional cross-border capacity
of 2250 MW, i. e. an overall capacity of 5190 MW. Electricity price in the sum-
mer peak period is thereby 25.1 e/MWh within both countries. Cf. Figure 16
for the price development in the Dutch market.
Regarding the exemplary price development in the Dutch market, it can be
seen that investments in cross-border transmission capacities do not always
yield better market outcome, at least not in every country. Depending on
producers’ market behavior, electricity exchange expansion can also lead to
increasing market prices in some countries. As was already described for the
perfect competitive equilibrium in the German market, a similar impact on
prices can be seen for the Dutch market, assuming Cournot-Nash behavior
of the four German suppliers. Whereas price adjustment between Germany
and the Netherlands was mainly induced by equalization of marginal genera-
tion cost, the price increase in the Netherlands is caused particularly by the
relative small size of the Dutch market compared to Germany. Although the
price increase is only slight, two related effects can be described to contribute
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to this result. First, the enlargement of the bilateral transmission capacity
enables the oligopolistic German producers to exercise market power even in
the Netherlands, secondly, the high electricity prices in Germany induce rising
exports by Dutch producers to the German market.
Assuming competitive behavior and high degree of contract cover, electric-
ity prices in the Netherlands decrease by approximately 1.6 e/MWh in the
summer peak period (cf. Figure 16). As can be observed, price cuts are not
linear, but show a broken development. While price changes remain nearly
flat until approximately 60% of contract cover, prices decrease from a pre-
commitment ratio of approximately 70%. However, given the current cross-
border capacities, prices in the summer peak period are projected to reach
about 26.7 e/MWh, whereas considering network enlargement, prices amount
to 25.1 e/MWh, as has also been seen in Germany.
Regarding the analyzed exemplary capacity reinforcement of the German-
Dutch transmission lines, it can be noticed that increased forward trading
of the German producers has a stronger impact on German electricity prices
than the grid enlargement by 3000 MW. Nevertheless, bilateral network in-
vestment can lead to enhanced competition in non-perfect competitive market
structures. Regarding the reduction of transmission congestion between Ger-
many and other neighboring countries, e. g. France with a completely different
generation structure, might yield alternative results.
5 Conclusions
The model based analysis of competition in the German electricity market
has shown that there are potentials to exercise market power by the four
dominant producers RWE Power AG, E.ON Energie AG, Vattenfall Europe
AG and EnBW AG. It has also been discussed how network reinforcement
and forward trading influences producers’ market decisions and to what extent
these factors contribute to market power mitigation in Germany.
Regarding the competition enhancing effects of interregional electricity ex-
change and increasing amount of pre-committed production quantities, it can
be concluded that market power analyses at least for Germany should take
these aspects into account.
Within the analysis, both network enlargement and forward trading decisions
were determined exogenously, i. e. no explicit optima for transmission invest-
ment nor contracting were derived. Aside endogenous investment for network
infrastructure, which requires a different type of model, optimal forward trad-
ing decisions for the German producers can be derived within the described
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model structure, but with linearized demand and marginal cost functions.
Spot market equilibria therefore depend on German producers’ strategic and
risk hedging incentives.
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Fig. 2. Approximation of load duration curve for Germany, 2000
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Fig. 3. Inverse demand curves for different time segments in Germany
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Fig. 4. Merit order curve for Germany, 2005
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Fig. 5. Marginal cost curves and approximation for E.ON Energie AG
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Fig. 6. Marginal cost curves and approximation for Vattenfall Europe AG
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Fig. 7. Electricity prices in Germany - no transmission, no forward trading - Sce-
nario: Cournot (BC)
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Fig. 8. Electricity prices in Germany - transmission considered, no forward trading
- Scenario: Cournot (i)
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Fig. 9. Electricity prices in Germany - transmission enlargement, no forward trading
- Scenario: Cournot (i+)
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Fig. 10. Electricity prices in Germany - transmission considered, increasing forward
quantities - Scenario: Cournot (ii)
26
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Degreeof contract cover [%]
L
e
rn
e
r
In
d
e
x
EON RWE
Vattenfall EnBW
Fringe
Fig. 11. Lerner Index of German producers in the winter off-peak period - trans-
mission considered, increasing forward quantities - Scenario: Cournot (ii)
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Fig. 12. Electricity generation of German producers in the winter off-peak period -
transmission considered, increasing forward quantities - Scenario: Cournot (ii)
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Fig. 13. Electricity generation of German producers in the intermediate peak period
- transmission considered, increasing forward quantities - Scenario: Cournot (ii)
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Fig. 14. Profits of German producers - transmission considered, increasing forward
quantities - Scenario: Cournot (ii)
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Fig. 15. Electricity price in the summer peak period in Germany - transmission
enlargement, increasing forward quantities - Scenario: Cournot (ii+)
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Fig. 16. Electricity price in the summer peak period in the Netherlands - transmis-
sion enlargement, increasing forward quantities - Scenario: Cournot (ii+)
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Table 1
Interregional transmission capacities among countries [MW]
DE FR BE/LU NL DK SW PL CZ AT CH
DE ∞ 3120 760 2940 1750 460 1242 1512 1460 3630
FR 3120 ∞ 1150 - - - - - - 590
BE/LU 760 1150 ∞ 1030 - - - - - -
NL 2940 - 1030 ∞ - - - - - -
DK 1750 - - - ∞ 924 - - - -
SW 460 - - - 924 ∞ 240 - - -
PL 1242 - - - - 240 ∞ 658 - -
CZ 1512 - - - - - 658 ∞ 234 -
AT 1460 - - - - - - 234 ∞ 370
CH 3630 590 - - - - - - 370 ∞
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Table 2. Installed generation capacities of strategic players and fringe in Germany and neighboring countries [MW]
Fuel type RWE E.ON Vattenfall EnBW Fringe FR BE/LU NL DK SW PL CZ AT CH
Hard coal 7249 9461 1729 3288 7161 7200 2502 4196 5722 879 20064 1652 1335 -
Soft coal 10554 1425 6932 453 718 - - - - 5 8269 7320 428 -
Gas 4297 3808 870 1083 8809 5898 6882 15440 2178 557 947 1808 3806 226
Oil 188 1779 1429 617 1375 8526 341 669 1313 3625 162 284 340 311
Nuclear 5499 8473 1421 4272 597 63200 5738 449 - 9050 - 3471 - 3230
Hydro
- RoR, Lake 741 1320 9 447 2390 20971 146 129 39 16024 629 1057 10054 12304
- Pumped 793 1110 2883 368 263 4302 2307 - - 427 1484 1145 1846 907
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Table 3
Lerner-Index (LI) and profit [mil.e] of German producers - no transmission, no
forward trading
RWE E.ON Vattenfall EnBW Fringe
LI min/max 0.69/0.82 0.66/0.80 0.65/0.72 0.53/0.59 0.00/0.25
Cournot 3421 3272 2847 2265 3784
Profit
Compet. 1635 1324 802 588 483
Table 4
Lerner-Index (LI) and profit [mil.e] of German producers - transmission allowed,
no forward trading
RWE E.ON Vattenfall EnBW Fringe
LI min/max 0.48/0.65 0.44/0.61 0.43/0.52 0.36/0.43 0.00/0.00
Cournot (i) 2027 1824 1390 1082 1390
Profit
Compet. (i) 1651 1261 753 554 420
Table 5
Lerner-Index (LI) and profit [mil.e] of German producers - transmission enlarged,
no forward trading
RWE E.ON Vattenfall EnBW Fringe
LI min/max 0.45/0.60 0.42/0.57 0.41/0.47 0.33/0.38 0.00/0.00
Cournot (i+) 1836 1634 1220 936 1112
Profit
Compet. (i+) 1601 1240 749 553 416
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